This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: May 3, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

_____

Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC
v.
Ronald Mark Huber
_____

Opposition No. 91232736

_____

Mary L. Kevlin, Richard S. Mandel, Timothy J. Buckley, and Joelle A. Milov of
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. for
Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC

Daniel M. Northfield for
Ronald Mark Huber

_____

Before Bergsman, Shaw and Lynch,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lynch, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Ronald Mark Huber (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of

the mark CUBNOXIOUS in standard characters (the “Application”) for “shirts” in
Opposition No. 91232736

International Class 25.1 Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC (“Opposer”) opposes

registration of the mark based on Applicant’s alleged lack of bona fide intent to use

the mark in commerce at the time he filed the application, rendering the application

void ab initio under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), and alleged

likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d),

with Opposer’s following live registered marks, shown below, status and title copies

of which were submitted for the record:2

Registration Number/ Mark Goods/Services
Application Serial
Number
Reg. No. 869838 Entertainment services in the nature of baseball
exhibitions rendered live and through the media of
radio and television in Int. Class 41

(lined for colors red and blue)
Reg. No. 1042652 Includes: T-shirts, sweatshirts, pajamas, ponchos,
jackets, pants, and robes in Int. Class 25

Reg. No. 1538033 Flashlights in Int. Class 11

Reg. No. 1538151 Includes: Clothing, namely, t-shirts in Int. Class 25

1 Application Serial No. 86879907 was filed on January 19, 2016, based on Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
211 TTABVUE (Opposer’s First Notice of Reliance). Citations refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s
online docketing system. See Turdin v. Trilobite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, 1476 n.6 (TTAB
2014). Opposer also introduced Reg. No. 5414341 for the mark THAT’S CUB for a variety
of services in Int. Class 41. Because the registration was not pleaded and, as discussed below,
we need not rely on it, it is not included in the table.

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Opposition No. 91232736

Reg. No. 1538193 Clothing, namely t-shirts in Int. Class 25

(CHICAGO disclaimed)
Reg. No. 1544313 CHICAGO CUBS Includes: Clothing, namely, t-shirts, sweatshirts,
(CHICAGO disclaimed) caps and hooded sweatshirts in Int. Class 25
Reg. No. 1548675 CHICAGO CUBS Entertainment services in the nature of baseball
(CHICAGO disclaimed) exhibitions in Int. Class 41
Reg. No. 150472 Paper goods and printed matter, namely, baseball
cards in Int. Class 16

Reg. No. 1612016 Publications and printed matter, namely, souvenir
programs in Int. Class 16; Entertainment services in
the nature of baseball exhibitions in Int. Class 41
Reg. No. 1916572 Clothing, namely, shirts, caps, shorts, T-shirts, hats,
uniforms, uniform jerseys, wind resistant jackets,
short sets, sweatpants, sweatshirts in Int. Class 25

Reg. No. 1694837 CUBS CARE Raising, receiving and distributing charitable funds
by means of special events in Int. Class 36
Reg. No. 3199968 MR. CUB Includes: Baseball jerseys in Int. Class 25
Reg. No. 3231135 Clothing, namely, caps, hats, shirts, t-shirts, tank
tops, sweaters, pullovers, vests, shorts, pants,
dresses, skirts, baseball uniforms, jerseys, warm-up
suits, jogging suits, sweatshirts, sweatpants,
underwear, robes, sleepwear, swimwear, jackets,
ponchos, cloth bibs, infant wear, jumpers, rompers,
coveralls, creepers, baby booties, ties, footwear,
socks, hosiery, slippers in Int. Class 25
Reg. No. 3231136 CUBS Entertainment services, namely, baseball games,
competitions and exhibitions rendered live and
through broadcast media including television and
radio, and via a global computer network or a
commercial on-line service; information services,
namely, providing information in the field of sports,
entertainment and related topics, and providing for
informational messages relating thereto; educational
services in the nature of baseball skills programs,
baseball camps and clinics offered live;
entertainment services, namely, production of
programming broadcast via television, radio and a
global computer network or a commercial on-line
service; organizing community sporting events;
providing facilities for sports tournaments and
competitions relating to baseball; organizing and
conducting fantasy sports, sports contests and
sweepstakes; providing on-line newsletters in the
field of baseball in Int. Class 41

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Opposition No. 91232736

Reg. No. 3231137 CUBS Clothing, namely, caps, hats, visors, knitted head
wear, shirts, t-shirts, tank tops, sweaters, pullovers,
vests, shorts, pants, dresses, skirts, baseball
uniforms, jerseys, warm-up suits, jogging suits,
sweatshirts, sweatpants, underwear, robes, sleep
wear, swimwear, jackets, ponchos, cloth bibs, infant
wear, jumpers, rompers, coveralls, creepers, baby
booties, ties, footwear, socks, hosiery, slippers in Int.
Class 25
Reg. No. 3320038 Toys and sporting goods, namely, stuffed toys, plush
toys, bean bag toys, foam toys, foam novelty items,
namely, foam fingers, balloons, checker sets,
dominoes, board games, card games, dart boards and
dart board accessories, namely, darts, dart shafts and
dart flights, toy cars and trucks, jigsaw and
manipulative puzzles, yo-yo’s, toy banks, toy figures,
toy vehicles, toy airplanes, dolls and doll
accessories, bobbing head dolls, decorative wind
socks, miniature baseball bats, mini batting helmet
replicas, toy necklaces, baseballs, holders for
baseballs, autographed baseballs, playground balls,
golf balls, golf club head covers, golf club bags,
billiard accessories, namely, cues, billiard balls,
baseball bases, baseball bats, batting gloves,
inflatable toys; costume masks; Christmas tree
ornaments, excluding confectionery and
illumination articles, and Christmas stockings;
playing cards in Int. Class 28
Reg. No. 3320039 Athletic bags, overnight bags, backpacks, duffel
bags, tote bags, beach bags, knapsacks, attaché
cases, briefcases, purses, wallets, billfolds, cosmetic
cases sold empty, toiletry cases sold empty, business
card cases, luggage, luggage tags, suitcases,
umbrellas, dog collars, and dog leashes in Int. Class
18
Reg. No. 3320040 Paper goods and printed matter, namely, trading
cards, posters, stickers, decals, temporary tattoos,
bumper stickers, score books, scorecards, printed
baseball game programs, magazines and books
featuring baseball, brochures featuring baseball,
writing pads, note paper, notebooks, binders,
stationery-type portfolios, stationery folders, book
covers, calendars, greeting cards, postcards, printed
bank checkbooks, checkbook covers, gift wrapping
paper, paper gift and party bags, paper party goods
in the nature of paper party decorations; paper
napkins, mounted and un-mounted photographs,
photograph albums, lithographs, paperweights, pens,
pencils, crayons, non-electric erasers, pencil cases,
art pictures, and art prints in Int. Class 16
Reg. No. 3320041 CUBS Toys and sporting goods, namely, stuffed toys, plush
toys, bean bag toys, foam toys, foam novelty items,
namely, foam fingers, balloons, checker sets,
dominoes, board games, card games, dart boards and
dart board accessories, namely, darts, dart shafts and
dart flights, toy cars and trucks, jigsaw and
manipulative puzzles, toy banks, toy figures, toy
vehicles, toy airplanes, dolls and doll accessories,

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Opposition No. 91232736

bobbing head dolls, decorative wind socks,
miniature baseball bats, mini batting helmet replicas,
toy necklaces, baseballs, holders for baseballs,
autographed baseballs, playground balls, golf balls,
golf club head covers, golf club bags, billiard
accessories, namely, cues, billiard balls and baseball
bases, baseball bats, batting gloves, inflatable toys;
costume masks; Christmas tree ornaments,
excluding confectionery and illumination articles,
and Christmas stockings; playing cards in Int. Class
28
Reg. No. 3320042 CUBS Athletic bags, overnight bags, backpacks, duffel
bags, tote bags, beach bags, knapsacks, attaché
cases, briefcases, purses, wallets, billfolds, cosmetic
cases sold empty, toiletry cases sold empty, business
card cases, luggage, luggage tags, suitcases,
umbrellas, dog collars, and dog leashes in Int. Class
18
Reg. No. 3320043 CUBS Paper goods and printed matter, namely, trading
cards, posters, stickers, decals, temporary tattoos,
bumper stickers, score books, scorecards, printed
baseball game programs, magazines and books
featuring baseball, brochures featuring baseball,
writing pads, note paper, notebooks, binders,
stationery-type portfolios, stationery folders, book
covers, calendars, greeting cards, postcards, printed
bank checkbooks, checkbook covers, gift wrapping
paper, paper gift and party bags, paper party goods
in the nature of paper party decorations; paper
napkins, mounted and un-mounted photographs,
photograph albums, lithographs, paperweights, pens,
pencils, crayons, non-electric erasers, pencil cases,
art pictures, and art prints in Int. Class 16
Reg. No. 3320044 CUBS Jewelry, namely, bracelets, charms, earrings, rings,
belly rings, necklaces, pendants, watches, costume
jewelry, silicone or rubber bracelets and wristbands
in the nature of bracelets, medallions, ornamental
metal pins, lapel pins, cuff links, metal belt buckles
of precious metal, money clips of precious metal,
key chains of precious metal, key rings of precious
metal, clocks, wall clocks, alarm clocks, and non-
monetary coins of precious metal in Int. Class 14
Reg. No. 3326192 Pre-recorded videodiscs relating to baseball; cell
phone accessories, namely, cases and face plate
covers; calculators; electric switch plate covers;
luminous signs, neon signs; sunglasses; decorative
magnets; video and computer game cartridges, video
and computer game discs; computer accessories,
namely, mouse pads, computer game programs, and
computer application programs downloadable from
a global computer network in the field of baseball in
Int. Class 9
Reg. No. 3326193 CUBS Pre-recorded videodiscs relating to baseball; pre-
recorded audio discs relating to baseball; cases for
personal digital assistants, cell phone accessories,
namely, cases and face plate covers; binoculars;
calculators; electric switch plate covers; luminous
signs, neon signs; sunglasses; decorative magnets;

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Opposition No. 91232736

protective helmets, video and computer game
cartridges, video and computer game discs, video
and computer game cassettes computer accessories,
namely, mouse pads, computer game programs, and
computer application programs downloadable from
a global computer network in the field of baseball in
Int. Class 9
Reg. No. 3403043 Clothing, namely, caps, hats, headbands, visors,
shirts, T-shirts, tank tops, pullovers, baseball
uniforms, jerseys, sweatshirts, jackets in Int. Class
25

Reg. No. 3403044 Clothing, namely, caps, hats, shirts, T-shirts, tank
tops, pullovers, baseball uniforms, jerseys,
sweatshirts, jackets in Int. Class 25

Reg. No. 3644960 CUBBIES Clothing, namely, caps, hats, shirts, T-shirts in Int.
Class 25
Reg. No. 3703178 Clothing, namely, caps, hats, shirts, T-shirts,
baseball uniforms, jerseys, sweatshirts, jackets in Int.
Class 25

Reg. No. 3854382 Clothing, namely, caps, hats, shirts, T-shirts, tank
tops in Int. Class 25

Reg. No. 5424582 Clothing, namely, headwear, shirts, athletic
uniforms, jerseys, jackets in Int. Class 25

Reg. No. 5561908 THAT’S CUB Clothing, namely, shirts, footwear in Int. Class 25

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Opposition No. 91232736

In his answer, Applicant admits that he has not yet used his mark, but otherwise

denies the salient allegations in the notice of opposition.3 The opposition is fully

briefed.

I. Standing and Priority

Applicant does not contest Opposer’s standing or priority. Nonetheless, Opposer

must prove standing by showing a real interest in the outcome of the proceeding and

a reasonable basis for believing that it would suffer damage if the mark is registered.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1063; Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270,

111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Opposer’s pleaded registrations, for which

Opposer has proven status and title, establish its standing. See Coach Servs. v.

Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1727-28 (Fed. Cir. 2012);

Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir.

2000).

Also, Section 2(d) priority is not in issue as to the marks and the goods and

services covered by these registrations. See Top Tobacco LP v. North Atlantic Op. Co.,

101 USPQ2d 1163, 1169 (TTAB 2011) (citing King Candy, Co. v. Eunice King’s

Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 82 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974)).

II. Lack of Bona Fide Intent to Use

The Trademark Act provides in pertinent part that “[a] person who has a bona

fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to use a

trademark in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal

3 10 TTABVUE 1 (Applicant’s Amended Answer).

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Opposition No. 91232736

register….” Trademark Act Section 1(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). The bona fide

intent requirement “must be read in conjunction with the revised definition of ‘use in

commerce’ in Section 45 of the Trademark Act, which the Trademark Law Revision

Act of 1988 amended to require that such use be ‘in the ordinary course of trade, and

not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.’” Commodore Elec. Ltd. v. CBM

Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 USPQ2d 1503, 1507 (TTAB 1993).

The “determination of whether an applicant has a bona fide intention to use the

mark in commerce is to be a fair, objective determination based on all the

circumstances.” Lane Ltd. v. Jackson Int’l Trading Co., 33 USPQ2d 1351, 1355 (TTAB

1994). “Opposer has the initial burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the

evidence that [A]pplicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark on the identified

goods.” Boston Red Sox Baseball Club LP v. Sherman, 88 USPQ2d 1581, 1587 (TTAB

2008). Opposer can establish its prima facie case of no bona fide intent “by proving

that [A]pplicant has no documentary evidence to support its allegation in the

application of its claimed bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce as of the

application filing date.” Saul Zaentz Co. v. Bumb, 95 USPQ2d 1723, 1727 (TTAB

2010). If Opposer satisfies this burden, the burden of production shifts to Applicant

to offer additional evidence showing its bona fide intent to use its mark in commerce.

Id.; see also Commodore Elec., 26 USPQ2d at 1507 n.11.

Opposer makes a prima facie case of lack of bona fide intent in this case by

establishing that Applicant has essentially no supporting documentary evidence from

the timeframe of January 19, 2016, the filing date of his application. In response to

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Opposition No. 91232736

Opposer’s Interrogatory No. 18 seeking the identification of such documents,

Applicant identified only his intent-to-use application, which does not demonstrate

bona fide intent.4 Research In Motion Ltd. v. NBOR Corp., 92 USPQ2d 1926, 1931

(TTAB 2009) (“If the filing and prosecution of a trademark application constituted a

bona fide intent to use a mark, then in effect, lack of a bona fide intent to use would

never be a ground for opposition or cancellation, since an inter partes proceeding can

only be brought if the defendant has filed an application.”). Applicant subsequently

identified and produced a single undated page with the following content:

5

Applicant also submitted this same document as an exhibit to his testimony affidavit,

and we note that he did not provide the date of the document, instead merely stating

that it constitutes “lettering ideas that I might use on a product in commerce.”6 This

undated document with minimal content does not constitute documentary evidence

4 12 TTABVUE 33 (Opposer’s Second Notice of Reliance).
5 Id. at 33, 42.
6 30 TTABVUE 4 (Ronald Huber affidavit).

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Opposition No. 91232736

of a bona fide intent to use the mark contemporaneous with Applicant’s January 2016

filing date, and Applicant has provided no other documents as proof. Applicant

explicitly stated in discovery responses that he had no other documentation reflecting

his bona fide intention at the relevant time:

Interrogatory No. 18: State whether Applicant has any
documentation, including, without limitation, business
plans, marketing plans, memos, correspondence or draft
proposals of any kind, reflecting Applicant’s bona fide
intention, prior to or as of January 19, 2016, to use the
Applied-for Mark in connection with the goods covered by
the Application.

Answer: None other than the Applicant’s application for
trademark.7

Given the absence of documentary evidence of Applicant’s bona fide intent to use

the mark, the burden shifts to Applicant to produce other evidence of the requisite

intent. Saul Zaentz Co., 95 USPQ2d at 1729. Apart from what we have discussed

above, the only other evidence of alleged bona fide intent Applicant points to in his

brief is his three-sentence testimony affidavit consisting of the following content:

If I am granted this trademark for this case, for the mark
CUBNOXIOUS (Application serial number 86879907), I
plan to use the mark in commerce for the general public,
not for any specific geographical region or specific group of
persons. I do not intend to specifically target either fans or
opponents of the Chicago Cubs or any other sports team.
Attached to this Affidavit are lettering ideas that I might
use on a product in commerce.8

7 12 TTABVUE 33 (Opposer’s Second Notice of Reliance).
8 30 TTABVUE 4 (Ronald Huber Affidavit).

– 10 –
Opposition No. 91232736

We do not find Applicant’s conclusory statement persuasive to show that on January

19, 2016, Applicant had a bona fide intent to use the mark. See Research In Motion

Ltd., 92 USPQ2d at 1931 (applicant’s stated belief that the applied-for mark would

be “a good mark for future use” does not establish a bona fide intent to use). This type

of “mere statement of subjective intention, without more,” does not suffice. See Lane

Ltd., 33 USPQ2d at 1355; see also L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883

(TTAB 2008). Thus, Applicant has not rebutted Opposer’s showing.

Moreover, Applicant’s own discovery responses corroborate the lack of bona fide

intent. For example, in response to Interrogatory No. 1 regarding the date Applicant

selected his mark, he characterized the situation as follows: “When Applicant applied

for a trademark, 1-19-2016, Applicant selected Applicant’s mark for potential future

use. No specific date was set for date of intended use.”9 We find Applicant’s statement

in this regard more in keeping with filing an “application merely to reserve a right in

the mark.” See Saul Zaentz Co., 95 USPQ2d at 1729 (criticizing the applicant’s

statement that he applied for the mark “just for the opportunity to create something

in the future”). Other discovery responses contain similarly noncommittal language,

such as that the nature of Applicant’s intended use was “undetermined at this time.”10

Finally, we note that Applicant has not shown any established business or relevant

experience in the industry that might suggest bona fide intent. Contrast Rolex Watch

USA, Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., 101 USPQ2d 1188, 1197 (TTAB 2011) (prima facie

9 12 TTABVUE 27 (Opposer’s Second Notice of Reliance) (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 29.

– 11 –
Opposition No. 91232736

lack of bona fide intent from no documentary evidence overcome by showing capacity

to market and manufacture the goods identified in its application, which applicant

proved were an extension of its current product line).

Thus, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Applicant lacked the

requisite bona fide intention to use the CUBNOXIOUS mark in commerce when he

filed his intent-to-use application. Applicant lacks documentary evidence to support

his bona fide intent claim, which suffices in itself to make Opposer’s prima facie case

on this ground. See Saul Zaentz Co., 95 USPQ2d at 1730; Commodore Elec., 26

USPQ2d at 1507; Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, 88 USPQ2d at 1587; Research In

Motion Ltd., 92 USPQ2d at 1931. Applicant presented no persuasive evidence to

overcome the prima facie case, and other evidence corroborates the lack of bona fide

intent by suggesting that he filed his intent-to-use application merely to reserve a

right in the mark “for potential future use.” We conclude that Opposer has established

this Section 1(b) ground of opposition, such that the application is void ab initio. The

opposition on this ground is sustained.

III. Likelihood of Confusion

The determination under Section 2(d) involves an analysis of all of the probative

evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours

& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (setting forth factors to be

considered, hereinafter referred to as “DuPont factors”); see also In re Majestic

Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A likelihood of

confusion analysis often focuses on the similarities between the marks and the

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Opposition No. 91232736

similarities between the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,

544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated

by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of

the goods and differences in the marks.”). Opposer bears the burden of proving its

claim of likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence. Cunningham,

55 USPQ2d at 1848.

We focus our analysis on Opposer’s registrations that include shirts of some kind

among the identified goods (hereinafter, “Opposer’s registrations” or “Opposer’s

marks”), as follows:

Reg. No. 1544313 CHICAGO CUBS (CHICAGO disclaimed)
Reg. No. 3199968 MR. CUB
Reg. No. 3231137 CUBS
Reg. No. 3644960 CUBBIES
Reg. No. 5561908 THAT’S CUB

We consider the marks and goods in these registrations most relevant for the

likelihood of confusion determination. See Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243,

1245 (TTAB 2010).

A. The Goods, Trade Channels, and Classes of Consumers

The subject application identifies “shirts” and Opposer’s registrations all include

shirts, either generally identified as such, or more specifically identified as particular

types of shirts, such as sweatshirts, t-shirts, baseball jerseys, etc. Thus, the goods

overlap, and are legally identical in part.

We must therefore presume that the channels of trade and potential consumers

are also identical in part. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905,
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Opposition No. 91232736

1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Board entitled to rely on this legal presumption in

determining likelihood of confusion); Genesco Inc. v. Martz, 66 USPQ2d 1260, 1268

(TTAB 2003) (“Given the in-part identical and in-part related nature of the parties’

goods, and the lack of any restrictions in the identifications thereof as to trade

channels and purchasers, these clothing items could be offered and sold to the same

classes of purchasers through the same channels of trade.”). Thus, the second and

third DuPont factors weigh strongly in favor of a finding of likely confusion.

B. The Strength of Opposer’s Marks

The strength of a mark under the fifth DuPont factor rests on the extent to which

“a significant portion of the relevant consuming public . . . recognizes the mark as a

source indicator.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857

F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve

Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694

(Fed. Cir. 2005)). This factor involves assessing the mark “‘along a spectrum from

very strong to very weak.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). A very strong mark

receives a wider latitude of legal protection in the likelihood of confusion analysis.

See Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1694 (strong marks “enjoy wide latitude of legal

protection” and are “more attractive as targets for would-be copyists”).

The commercial strength of a mark may be measured indirectly by the volume of

sales and advertising expenditures in connection with the goods and services sold

under the mark, and other factors such as length of time of use of the mark;

widespread critical assessments; notice by independent sources of the goods and

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Opposition No. 91232736

services identified by the marks; and the general reputation of the goods and services.

Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1354 (TTAB 2014);

see also Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1308

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing indirect evidence as appropriate proof of strength).

In addition to its large number of registrations, and long use of its marks, Opposer

submitted a wide variety of evidence of significant consumer exposure to its marks.11

For example, confidential testimony establishing the substantial number of unique

visitors to Opposer’s website in recent timeframes.12 Opposer also features some of

its marks on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and

Snapchat. Opposer’s Facebook page has more than three million followers, its Twitter

feed has more than two million followers, and its Instagram account has over one

million followers.13

Opposer also provided evidence of considerable attendance figures at Cubs

baseball games where Opposer’s marks are displayed.14 Opposer’s Assistant Director

of Brand Development and Activation, John Morrison testified that on average, three

million fans per season attend games at Wrigley Field, where Opposer’s marks are

prominently featured, such as in game programs and stadium signage.15 Also,

11 Our analysis of the strength of Opposer’s marks includes all of the marks.
1217 TTABVUE 4-7 (confidential declaration of Lara Pitaro Wisch), 16 TTABVUE (public
version), 18 TTABVUE 1-38 (exhibits to the declaration).
1325 TTABVUE 12 (Morrison declaration); see also 13 TTABVUE 134 (A screenshot of
Opposer’s Instagram page that shows some of its marks on shirts displays “1.1m followers.”).
14 13 TTABVUE 10-107 (Opposer’s Third Notice of Reliance).
15 25 TTABVUE 15 (Morrison declaration).

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Opposition No. 91232736

consumers experience Cubs games broadcast on radio and TV, including digitally

streamed TV,16 with a large number of viewers.17 Uncontradicted testimony

establishes that “Opposer’s CUB marks appear prominently throughout such

broadcasts and streams.”18 In addition, testimony also details a sponsorship program

that includes promotion of Opposer’s marks through various industries with

companies such as Bank of America, Budweiser, Gatorade, General Motors, Nathan’s

Famous, MasterCard International, Nike, Scotts, SiriusXM, Starwood Hotels and

Resorts, and T-Mobile.19 Opposer also advertises and promotes its registered marks

in a variety of media, and distributes promotional items bearing the marks. Its

confidential advertising and promotional expenses are included in the record.20

Opposer’s strength evidence extends more specifically to use of its marks on

various clothing items including shirts.21 Opposer’s Assistant Director of Brand

Development and Activation, John Morrison, provided confidential revenue figures

for sales of merchandise including clothing bearing Opposer’s marks in the stores at

Wrigley Field, Opposer’s home stadium.22 Confidential testimony regarding

16 Id.
1720 TTABVUE 7 (confidential declaration of Ethan G. Orlinsky), 19 TTABVUE 7 (public
version).
1820 TTABVUE 8 (confidential declaration of Ethan G. Orlinsky), 19 TTABVUE 8 (public
version), 21 TTABVUE (exhibits to the declaration).
19 19 TTABVUE 8 (Orlinsky declaration).
20 26 TTABVUE 11 (confidential declaration of John Morrison).
21 18 TTABVUE 39-76, 103-80 (exhibits to Wisch declaration).
2226 TTABVUE 10 (confidential declaration of John Morrison), 25 TTABVUE 10 (public
version).

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Opposition No. 91232736

merchandising and licensing of Opposer’s marks with clothing brands such as Nike,

Under Armour, Levi’s & Strauss Co., Vans, and Columbia, among others, reports

substantial revenue from these goods.23 The testimony exhibits include numerous

examples of shirts bearing Opposer’s marks.24

The record includes other examples of consumer exposure to Opposer’s marks in

connection with shirts. A CBS Sports online article bears the headline “Cubs’ Kris

Bryant has top-selling MLB jersey of 2015” and includes a picture of the player in his

baseball jersey with one of Opposer’s marks.25 An article from Thewrap.com on “10

Best Chicago Cubs Shout-Outs in Movies and TV” shows photo stills from films

including “Rookie of the Year,” with a boy in a Cubs baseball jersey that displays one

of Opposer’s marks.26

The record contains articles from the Chicago Tribune and the Library of Congress

in which renowned Cubs players from the early 1900’s, Joe Tinker, Johnny Evers and

Frank Chance, are shown wearing Cubs jerseys with some of Opposer’s marks.27

Applicant acknowledges in its brief that “Opposer has at least some regional fame,

and may have used its marks a while.”28 However, presumably in an effort to rebut

Opposer’s argument about the degree of strength of the marks, Applicant submitted

2323 TTABVUE 7-8 (confidential declaration of Denis Nolan), 22 TTABVUE (public version),
24 TTABVUE (exhibits to the declaration).
24 24 TTABVUE 4-15, 29, 71.
25 13 TTABVUE 198-99 (cbssports.com).
26 Id. at 133-34.
27 13 TTABVUE 106-113.
28 33 TTABVUE 11 (Applicant’s Brief).

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Opposition No. 91232736

some of Opposer’s responses to requests for admission to establish, inter alia, that

Opposer does not own or license certain websites, such as www.cub.com, does not own

various registrations that include CUB, that certain symbols used on the New York

Stock Exchange (NYSE) are not affiliated with Opposer, and that the word “cub” has

a defined meaning as a young carnivorous mammal.29

Applicant’s evidence does not demonstrate weakness because the record lacks the

necessary context to evaluate alleged third-party use and registration. Applicant

failed to introduce any of the third-party registrations that were the subject of his

requests for admission to Opposer, so that although the admissions refer to the

marks, there is no evidence of the goods and services covered by those registrations.

This negates their probative value to show weakness of Opposer’s marks, which

would depend on proof of the registration and use of similar marks for similar goods.

Cf. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017)

(disregarding third-party registrations for goods in other classes where the proffering

party “has neither introduced evidence, nor provided adequate explanation to support

a determination that the existence of I AM marks for goods in other classes, …

support a finding that registrants’ marks are weak with respect to the goods

identified in their registrations”). Similarly, the record lacks evidence of the

underlying third-party websites that include “cub” in their domain names, or of the

context of any third-party use of NYSE symbols that include “cub.” See Palm Bay

29 29 TTABVUE.

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Opposition No. 91232736

Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1693 (“[t]he probative value of third-party trademarks depends

entirely upon their usage.”).

Overall, Opposer’s admissions do not equate to proof of a degree of recent

consumer exposure to third-party use or registration of similar marks on similar

goods to show that consumers generally distinguish among marks containing “cub”

based on minor distinctions. See Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d

1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015); contrast Primrose Retirement

Communities, LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, 122 USPQ2d 1030 (TTAB

2016) (weakness found based on at least 85 actual uses of ROSE-formative marks for

similar services, eight similar third-party registrations, expert testimony and other

evidence regarding the common nature of ROSE-formative marks in the industry,

and testimony by opposer that it did not vigorously enforce its mark). Under the sixth

DuPont factor, the record is devoid of evidence of third-party use or registration of

similar marks on similar goods. Thus, Opposer’s marks do not appear to be

commercially weak; rather, they are commercially strong.

As to conceptual strength, Opposer has admitted that the ordinary meaning of

“cub” refers to a young mammal. However, Opposer correctly points out that in its

marks for clothing, as well as other goods and services, CUB is arbitrary as a “known

word used in an unexpected or uncommon way.” Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health &

Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining an arbitrary

mark as a “known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way” and observing that

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Opposition No. 91232736

such marks are typically strong); see also Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1692

(arbitrary terms are conceptually strong trademarks).

Opposer’s marks are conceptually strong. The evidence of commercial strength of

the marks, including Internet and social media consumer exposure, revenue

statistics, advertising expenditures and examples, and media coverage, reflects the

renown of Opposer’s marks through widespread consumer exposure to and

recognition of them. The scope of the evidence extends well beyond the mere

“regional” strength acknowledged by Applicant. Overall, we find Opposer’s marks to

be quite strong, weighing in favor of a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., UMG

Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 USPQ2d 1868, 1887 (TTAB 2011) (inferring

public recognition of MOTOWN mark based on use of mark for almost 50 years,

extensive nationwide sales of opposer’s recordings as well as numerous concerts and

television appearances featuring its music and artists and extensive nationwide

promotion of mark through traditional advertising and sale of collateral goods); Nike,

Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018, 1024-27 (TTAB 2011) (finding opposer’s JUST DO

IT mark famous based on pervasive third-party press and media references,

substantial advertising, publicity and nationwide sales and ownership of

registrations).

C. Similarity of the Marks

With respect to the marks, we must compare them “in their entireties as to

appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps., 73

USPQ2d at 1691 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). The proper comparison

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Opposition No. 91232736

inquires “not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-

side comparison, but whether they are sufficiently similar in their overall commercial

impression,” that source confusion is likely to result. Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v.

Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir.

2012). In fact, “marks ‘must be considered . . . in light of the fallibility of memory’ and

‘not on the basis of side-by-side comparison.’” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747,

113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

None of Opposer’s marks is identical to Applicant’s, but, as set forth in the table

above, Opposer’s standard-character marks include CUBS, CHICAGO CUBS,

CUBBIES, and THAT’S CUB. Opposer’s Assistant Director of Brand Development

and Activation, John Morrison, explained as follows:

Opposer’s CUB Marks frequently combine the CUB or
CUBS name or mark with other words to form unitary
marks and logo designs promoting the Club and various of
its goods and services. For example, Opposer has long used
and currently owns a registration for MR. CUB in
connection with baseball bats, jerseys and trading cards,
with the registration claiming a first use date of 1957.
Opposer also uses the marks CUBS CARE, CUBS
CHARITIES and CUBS SCHOLARS in connection with
various of its charitable activities and organizations. In
connection with the aforementioned services, Opposer has
used CUBS CARE since 1991, CUBS CHARITIES since
1986, and CUBS SCHOLARS since 2013. Opposer has long
used the mark CUBS CLUB for its fan club, and since 1985
it has used CUBS CONVENTION to identify its annual
two and a half day fan fest, which has been held in Chicago
every January for more than three decades. Opposer has
used the mark CUBS DESTINATIONS since 2007 as a
brand for various travel packages offered to fans in
connection with SPRING TRAINING and regular season
Cubs’ games. Last season, Opposer’s Class A Minor League

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Opposition No. 91232736

affiliate, the MYRTLE BEACH PELICANS, hosted a
CUBS-A-PALOOZA weekend….30

We find that this showing by Opposer of the use and registration of CUB- variant

marks contributes to the similarity consumers would perceive from the shared string

of letters, CUB-, in Applicant’s and Opposer’s marks. The shared lettering creates a

visual resemblance between the marks and renders them phonetically similar, an

important consideration in the analysis. See Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1911. While the

endings of the marks differ to such an extent that the marks themselves would not

likely be mistaken for one another, the marks nonetheless would be perceived as

variants of one another, coming from a common source. Opposer’s evidence of

registration and use of CUB-variant marks renders such a consumer misimpression

likely. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23

USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Opposer’s use of variations on the dominant

portion of its mark “would increase the likelihood that consumers would misconstrue

the source of insurance under the mark CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA”).

As to connotation and commercial impression, Applicant’s CUBNOXIOUS mark

likely would be perceived as a combination of the term CUB31 and the word

“obnoxious,” which typically is not a flattering term. However, Opposer provides

compelling evidence to show why consumers nonetheless likely would mistakenly

30 25 TTABVUE 7 (Morrison Declaration).
31While Applicant did not acknowledge his mark as a reference to the Chicago Cubs, Opposer
has noted that Applicant resides in the Des Moines, Iowa home base of Opposer’s Minor
League affiliate, the Iowa Cubs. 32 TTABVUE 9 (Opposer’s Brief); 25 TTABVUE 6 (Morrison
Declaration).

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Opposition No. 91232736

believe that it was the source of Applicant’s clothing. Opposer’s argument derives

from the idea that sports teams or their fans may seek to provoke opposing teams

and their fans, thereby embracing an offensive, or obnoxious, reputation. As Opposer

characterizes it in its Brief:

To a fan base notorious for its undying allegiance to the
Cubs, the CUBNOXIOUS designation at issue in this case
would surely be taken by many as a badge of honor that fits
quite comfortably within the Club’s creative and expansive
merchandising program, which already offers a wide
variety of different marks, designs, stylizations, themes
and imagery among its selection of officially licensed
products.32

Numerous articles from newspapers throughout the country reflect consumer

exposure to the idea that fans of the Chicago Cubs are highly committed, using terms

such as “loyal,” “die-hard,” and “faithful,” and describing their willingness to travel

and attend distant games such as in articles titled “Cubs fans invade the Brewers’

back yard” and “Cubs fans get nice and cozy at Chase [Field].”33 Other articles report

on Cubs fan events and activities, such as the Cubs Die Hard Fan Convention of

“Cubmaniacs” reported by the Chicago Tribune,34 and an article on the Bleacher

Nation website entitled “Cubs Fans Are Everywhere, and Will Go Anywhere.”35

Some go further in characterizing the nature of the fan base as obnoxious. One

article from the Chicago Daily Herald bears the headline “Cubs fans obnoxious? Of

32 32 TTABVUE 24 (Opposer’s Brief).
3314 TTABVUE 1-99 (various newspapers), id. at 142-43 (Post-Crescent), id. at 146-48
(Arizona Daily Star).
34 13 TTABVUE 645-46 (chicagotribune.com).
35 Id. at 647-50 (bleachernation.com).

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Opposition No. 91232736

course,”36 and another from the Chicago Tribune reports that “[Cincinnati] Reds

broadcaster rips ‘obnoxious’ Cubs fans.”37

Opposer even has provided some examples of Tweets using “Cubnoxious” to refer

to Cubs fans, compiled below from various threads:

36 Id. at 156-58.
37 Id. at 150-51.

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Opposition No. 91232736

38

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Opposition No. 91232736

A Yelp user review of an event at a Chicago park also refers to trying to avoid

“Cubnoxious Drunkards.”39

We find Opposer’s evidence convincing to demonstrate that the connotation and

commercial impression of Applicant’s mark is similar to Opposer’s marks. See

Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. v. 12th Man/Tennessee LLC, 83 USPQ2d 1073, 1077

(TTAB 2007) (applicant’s 12th BEAR mark confusingly similar to opposers’ BEARS

and CHICAGO BEARS marks as “12th” reinforced the connection with the Chicago

Bears football team by specifically identifying a fan of the team as the “twelfth

Bear.”).

Especially bearing in mind the strength of Opposer’s marks and the overlapping

goods, we deem Applicant’s mark sufficiently similar in appearance, sound,

connotation and commercial impression to Opposer’s marks to weigh in favor of likely

confusion.

D. Lack of Actual Confusion Evidence

While Opposer has acknowledged the lack of actual confusion evidence, given that

Applicant has not yet used his proposed mark in commerce, there has been no

opportunity for actual consumer confusion to occur. See DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567

(identifying seventh and eighth du Pont factors as “[t]he nature and extent of any

actual confusion,” and “[t]he length of time during and conditions under which there

38 14 TTABVUE 672 (twitter.com); see also 15 TTABVUE 49.
39 13 TTABVUE 666 (yelp.com).

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Opposition No. 91232736

has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion”). Accordingly, we find

the seventh and eighth factors neutral.

E. Purchasing Conditions

Both parties addressed the DuPont factor regarding consumers’ purchasing

conditions, relying on the nature of the identified goods without pointing to other

evidence. We have no basis to find that ordinary consumers purchasing shirts would

exercise more than an ordinary degree of care. This factor is neutral.

F. Bad Faith

Opposer argues that Applicant’s alleged evasiveness about his awareness of

Opposer’s marks and his lack of explanation why he selected his mark point to bad

faith. See, e.g., J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462,

18 USPQ2d 1889, 1891 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Whether there is evidence of intent to trade

on the goodwill of another is a factor to be considered.”); Jewelers Vigilance Comm.,

Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 853 F.2d 888, 7 USPQ2d 1628, 1630 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“proof

of intent to trade on another’s goodwill” can provide “persuasive evidence of likelihood

of confusion”) (citation omitted). Establishing bad faith requires a showing that

Applicant intentionally sought to trade on Opposer’s good will or reputation. See Big

Blue Prod. Inc. v. IBM Corp., 19 USPQ2d 1072 (TTAB 1991). While such intent may

be inferred from surrounding circumstances, even “mere knowledge of a competitor’s

mark is not equivalent to a deliberate attempt to deceive or to cause confusion.” Elec.

Water Conditioners, Inc. v. Turbomag Corp., 221 USPQ 162, 165 (TTAB 1984). We

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Opposition No. 91232736

cannot find based on this record such a showing of Applicant’s bad faith. This factor

is neutral.

G. Conclusion as to Likelihood of Confusion

Given the similarity of Opposer’s strong marks to Applicant’s mark, and the

overlap of their goods that move in some of the same channels of trade to the same

classes of consumers, we conclude that confusion is likely. The opposition on this

ground is sustained.

Decision: The opposition is sustained both on the ground of lack of bona fide

intent to use the mark in commerce as of the filing date of the application and on the

ground of likely confusion.

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