This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: June 13, 2019


Trademark Trial and Appeal Board


Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

Stan C. Sneeringer and Matthew J. Schmidt of Pedersen & Houpt, P.C.,

Meghan Reinhart, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 108,
Steven Berk, Managing Attorney (Application Serial No. 87228837).
Tara L. Bhupathi, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 124,
Lydia Belzer, Managing Attorney (Application Serial No. 87434823).

Before Taylor, Hightower, and Goodman,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Hightower, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant GR OPCO, LLC seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark

E11EVEN in standard characters for the following goods and services (as amended):

• “Musical recordings,” in International Class 9;
• “Musical production services provided by a music label,” in International
Class 41;1 and

1Application Serial No. 87228837, filed November 7, 2016, based on Applicant’s allegation of
a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce pursuant to Trademark Act Section 1(b),
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The application included goods and services in additional classes which
were divided into child application Serial No. 87977522 and are not before us.
Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

• “Night club services,” in International Class 41.2

The Trademark Examining Attorneys refused registration under Section 2(d) of

the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to a likelihood of confusion with the

following marks previously registered on the Principal Register:

• ELLEEVEN (typed drawing)3 for a “series of prerecorded compact discs,
prerecorded audio cassettes and prerecorded video cassettes, all featuring
music,” in International Class 9,4 and “entertainment services in the nature
of live musical performances,” in International Class 41;5 and

• E11EVEN MEDIA (in standard characters and with “MEDIA” disclaimed)
for “entertainment services in the nature of development, creation,
production and post-production services of multimedia entertainment
content; entertainment services, namely, multimedia production services;
film and video production; multimedia entertainment services in the nature
of development, production and post-production services in the fields of
video and films; photography services; post-production editing services in
the field of music, videos and film; video production services,” in
International Class 43.6

After the Trademark Examining Attorneys7 made the refusals final, Applicant

requested reconsideration as to application Serial No. 87228837 (the “’837

Application”) only. Reconsideration was denied. Applicant appealed the refusal of

both applications to this Board.

2Application Serial No. 87434823, filed May 3, 2017, also pursuant to Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act.
3Before November 2, 2003, “standard character” drawings were known as “typed” drawings.
A typed mark is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark. Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure (TMEP) § 807.03(i) (Oct. 2018).
4Registration No. 2471484, issued July 24, 2001 to Jessica Kunin, an individual with a Los
Angeles address; renewed.
5 Registration No. 2302712, issued December 21, 1999, also to Jessica Kunin; renewed.
6 Registration No. 4963786, issued May 24, 2016 to E11EVEN MEDIA LLC.
7 “Examining Attorney” as used infra refers to either Ms. Reinhart or Ms. Bhupathi.

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

I. Consolidation

These appeals present common questions of law and fact. Therefore, in the

interest of judicial economy, we consolidate them and decide them in this single

opinion. In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1915 (TTAB 2012). We have considered

all arguments and evidence filed in each appeal and taken into account relevant

factual differences between them.

We affirm the refusal to register as to each application and all three classes.

II. Likelihood of Confusion

Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts

in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of

confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567

(CCPA 1973); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201,

1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however, two key

considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between

the goods or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d

1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d)

goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods

and differences in the marks.”).

A. Similarity of the Marks

We begin our assessment with the similarity of the marks. In a likelihood of

confusion analysis, we compare the marks in their entireties for similarities and

dissimilarities in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression.

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks

confusingly similar. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB

2018). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead

whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression

such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection

between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797,

1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1550 (April 15, 2019) (quotation


Because similarity is determined based on the marks in their entireties, our

analysis is not predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components. In

re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015). On the other hand, “there

is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been

given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on

consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056,

224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).


We first consider the mark E11EVEN MEDIA in Registration No. 4963786 (the

“’786 Registration”), cited against the ’837 Application. This mark is highly similar to

Applicant’s mark, E11EVEN. Applicant’s entire mark is identical to the first term in

the cited mark, which we find to be its dominant part. As we have often said, the lead

element in a mark has a position of prominence; it is likely to be noticed and

remembered by consumers and so to play a dominant role in the mark. See, e.g.,

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

Detroit Athletic, 128 USPQ2d at 1049 (“The identity of the marks’ initial two words

is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first.”);

Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d

1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that VEUVE is a prominent

feature of the mark VEUVE CLICQUOT because it is the first word in the mark); In

re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (stating that

dominance of BARR in BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word

in the mark).

The only point of distinction between Applicant’s mark and this cited mark is the

addition of the disclaimed term MEDIA to the latter. Because it is highly descriptive

or generic in association with Registrant’s services, consumers are unlikely to rely on

MEDIA to identify the source of those services; thus, we do not ignore this word but

we do give it little weight.

While there is no rule that likelihood of confusion automatically applies where one

mark subsumes another, in this case, the fact that Applicant’s entire mark E11EVEN

is identical to the dominant and only distinctive term in the cited mark E11EVEN

MEDIA increases the similarity between the two. See, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601

F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming Board decision that ML

is likely to be perceived as a shortened version of ML MARK LEES, and stating that

“the presence of an additional term in the mark does not necessarily eliminate the

likelihood of confusion if some terms are identical”); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann

Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406, 407 (CCPA 1967) (affirming that THE LILLY is

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

likely to be confused with LILLI ANN); Hunter Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., 110 USPQ2d

1651, 1660-61 (TTAB 2014) (finding applicant’s mark PRECISION similar to

opposer’s mark PRECISION DISTRIBUTION CONTROL); see also China

Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 83 USPQ2d 1123, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

(finding the common word in CHI and CHI PLUS likely to cause confusion despite

differences in the marks’ designs).

Given the dominant shared term E11EVEN, we find the marks considered in their

entireties sufficiently similar in appearance, sound, meaning, and overall commercial

impression that persons who encounter them would be likely to assume a connection

between Applicant and Registrant. The first du Pont factor therefore weighs in favor

of a finding that confusion is likely between Applicant’s mark and the cited mark



We now turn to a comparison of Applicant’s mark with the mark ELLEEVEN, in

Registration Nos. 2302712 and 2471484 (the “’712 Registration” and “’484

Registration,” respectively), cited against both subject applications. Like Applicant’s

mark E11EVEN, this cited mark is a coined term that appears to be a variation on

the word “eleven.”

We make no finding as to whether the two marks are aurally similar, recognizing

that there is no “correct” pronunciation of these terms. See, e.g., StonCor Grp., Inc. v.

Specialty Coatings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1327, 111 USPQ2d 1649, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

(“There is no correct pronunciation of a trademark that is not a recognized word.”);

In re Allegiance Staffing, 115 USPQ2d 1319, 1325 (TTAB 2015) (agreeing that there

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

is no correct pronunciation of mark that is a coined term); see also In re Viterra Inc.,

671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that “there is no

correct pronunciation of a trademark, and consumers may pronounce a mark

differently than intended by the brand owner”).

This cited mark has an extra “e” in the middle and incorporates two “Ls” where

Applicant’s mark uses two “1s.” Contrary to Applicant’s argument, however,

Registrant is not limited to any particular depiction of its standard-character mark

and may use lower case “ls” that appear similar or identical to “1s.” See ’837

Application Reply Brief, 13 TTABVUE 6; Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1910. We find the

differences between the marks to be minor and the marks to be similar visually as

well as in connotation and overall commercial impression.

We bear in mind that, as discussed in Subsection B(1) infra, where goods or

services are legally identical, “the degree of similarity necessary to support a

conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,

668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We find Applicant’s mark to

be sufficiently similar to the cited mark ELLEEVEN that the first du Pont factor

weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

B. Similarity of the Goods and Services, Channels of Trade, and
Classes of Customers

We next consider the second and third du Pont factors, assessing the similarity or

dissimilarity of the goods and services, customers, and trade channels. The test is not

whether consumers would be likely to confuse the goods and services, but rather

whether they would be likely to be confused as to their source. Anderson, 101 USPQ2d

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

at 1919. Therefore, to support a finding of likelihood of confusion, it is not necessary

that the goods and services be identical or even competitive. It is sufficient that the

goods and services are related in some manner, or that the circumstances

surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same

persons in situations that would give rise, because of the marks, to a mistaken belief

that they originate from the same source or that there is an association or connection

between the sources. In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009).

We must look to the goods and services as identified in the involved applications

and cited registrations, not to any extrinsic evidence of actual use. Stone Lion Capital

Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir.

2014). For this reason, Applicant’s evidence and arguments pertaining to its and

Registrants’ geographic locations and actual uses of their marks are inapposite. E.g.,

Detroit Athletic, 128 USPQ2d at 1052 (citing In re, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,

1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).

A likelihood of confusion must be found as to the entire class if confusion is likely

for any item within the identification for that class. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen.

Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); C.H. Hanson,

116 USPQ2d at 1355.

1. Applicant’s Class 9 Goods (“musical recordings”)

The goods identified in the ’837 Application are “musical recordings.” The cited

’484 Registration for the mark ELLEEVEN identifies a “series of prerecorded compact

discs, prerecorded audio cassettes and prerecorded video cassettes, all featuring

music.” Applicant’s musical recordings encompass Registrant’s prerecorded compact

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

discs and audio cassettes featuring music. See In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc.,

114 USPQ2d 1134, 1137 (TTAB 2015) (“Applicant’s broadly worded identification of

‘furniture’ necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and

commercial furniture.’”). These goods thus are legally identical, and the second

du Pont factor weighs heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

Because the goods are legally identical in part, moreover, we must presume that

the channels of trade and classes of purchasers for these goods are the same. In re

Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1518-19 (TTAB 2016); see also

Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (finding Board entitled to rely on this legal presumption

in determining likelihood of confusion). The third du Pont factor strongly supports a

finding that confusion is likely between the Class 9 goods identified in the ’837

Application and the ’484 Registration.

2. “Musical production services provided by a music label” (Class 41)

We move to the Class 41 services recited in the ’837 Application, “musical

production services provided by a music label.” Registration is refused due to a

likelihood of confusion with the mark E11EVEN MEDIA for, inter alia, “post-

production editing services in the field of music, videos and film” (the ’786


We disagree with the assertion in the Examining Attorney’s brief for the ’837

Application that: “In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe its

video production services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type

described, including applicant’s more narrow ‘music production services provided by

a music label.’” 12 TTABVUE 17. Nonetheless, the Examining Attorney submitted

Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

nine existing, use-based registrations owned by third parties reciting both musical

production services and post-production services in the field of music.8 This evidence

suggests that the respective services are of a kind which may emanate from a single

source under a single mark. See, e.g., In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1738 (TTAB

2018); C.H. Hanson, 116 USPQ2d at 1355-56. Although none of the services are

identified in the third-party registrations as being offered by a music label, based on

this record, we find that “musical production services” and “post-production editing

services in the field of music” are similar and related whether offered by a record label

or different type of provider. The second du Pont factor weighs in favor of a finding

that confusion is likely as to these services.

3. “Night club services” (Class 41)

Finally, we address the “night club services” identified in Application Serial

No. 8743823 (the “’823 Application”). The Examining Attorney refused registration of

the ’823 Application on the ground that confusion is likely with the mark ELLEEVEN

for “entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances” in the ’712


The Examining Attorney submitted evidence that night clubs often feature live

musical performances. In fact, a entry characterizes the provision of

live music as a defining characteristic of a nightclub: “A nightclub is generally

distinguished from regular bars, pubs or taverns by the inclusion of a stage for live

8See September 20, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 57-75; February 23, 2017 Office Action at
TSDR 75-96.

– 10 –
Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

music, one or more dance floor areas and a DJ booth, where a DJ plays recorded

music.”9 The Examining Attorney also submitted a definition of “nightclub” as “a

place of entertainment open at night usually serving food and liquor and providing

music and space for dancing and often having a floor show.”10 In addition, the

Examining Attorney made of record 17 existing, use-based registrations owned by

third parties reciting both night club services and entertainment services in the

nature of live musical performances.11 She also proffered printouts from at least five

night club websites offering live musical performances.12

This evidence supports a finding that the services recited in the ’823 Application

and the ’712 Registration are related and complementary, and travel through the

same channels of trade to the same consumers; that is, night club patrons are the

audience for live musical performances offered at those venues. The similarity of the

marks, coupled with the related, complementary nature of the services, marketed in

the same trade channels, leads us to the conclusion that prospective consumers are

likely to confuse the involved services as originating from or associated with or

sponsored by the same entity. See, e.g., In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.,

9 March 10, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 39.
10 August 8, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 27 (from
nightclub). Because the Board may take judicial notice of definitions from dictionaries,
including online dictionaries that exist in printed format, we deny the Examining Attorney’s
objection to another definition of “nightclub” cited by Applicant in its appeal brief. ’823
Application, Appeal Brief, 4 TTABVUE 13; Examiner’s Brief, 6 TTABVUE 12; Reply Brief, 7
TTABVUE 7 n.1. See, e.g., In re S. Malhotra & Co. AG, 128 USPQ2d 1100, 1104 n.9 (TTAB
2018). Applicant also cited, but did not submit a printout of, this definition in its February 8,
2018 Response to Office Action at TSDR 4.
11 March 10, 2018 Final Office Action at 2-31; August 8, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 4-26.
12 March 10, 2018 Final Office Action at 32-38; August 8, 2017 Office Action at TSDR 29-30.

– 11 –
Serial Nos. 87228837 and 87434823 (consolidated)

748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[C]omplementary use has

long been recognized as a relevant consideration in determining a likelihood of

confusion.”); Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 USPQ2d 1701, 1713 (TTAB

2010) (stating that, by definition, flashlights and flashlight bulbs are

complementary). In our likelihood of confusion analysis, these findings under the

second and third du Pont factors weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

III. Conclusion

We have found that the first and second du Pont factors favor a likelihood of

confusion as to each cited mark and class of goods and services, and that the third

factor supports a finding that confusion is likely for Applicant’s “musical recordings”

and “night club services.” Applicant and the Examining Attorney have not presented

evidence regarding other du Pont factors. To the extent that such du Pont factors may

nonetheless be applicable, we treat them as neutral.

For all the reasons detailed above, we find that Applicant’s mark E11EVEN is

likely to cause confusion with the marks in cited Registration Nos. 2302712, 2471484,

and 4963786 when used in association with the goods and services identified in the

subject applications.

Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the

Trademark Act is affirmed as to both applications.

– 12 –