This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: June 7, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Shin-Kyu Choi
_____

Serial No. 87386932
_____

Diane J. Mason of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP,1
for Shin-Kyu Choi.

Alison Keeley, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 113,
Myriah Habeeb, Managing Attorney.

_____

Before Cataldo, Bergsman, and Coggins,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Coggins, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Shin-Kyu Choi (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the

mark PRINCE KONG (in standard characters) for:

board games; arcade video game machines; game
apparatus for playing action type target games sold as a
unit; nets for ball games; hand-held, non-electronic skill
games; video game machines; toys namely, soft dolls,

1 Counsel’s change of correspondence address, filed May 10, 2019 in the electronic application
file, is noted. A separate notice of the change of address should have been filed with the Board
using ESTTA. TBMP § 117.07 (2018). To expedite this matter, a copy of the change of address
has been placed in the electronic appeal file. See 11 TTABVUE. It should be noted that the
domestic representative address was not changed; a different TEAS form is required for that.
Serial No. 87386932

puzzles, balloons, return top toys, toy figures attachable to
pencils, rubber balls, children’s multiple activity toys,
basketballs, bath toys, baseballs, beach balls, collectible
toy figures, dolls, doll accessories, doll playsets, electric
action toys, equipment sold as a unit for playing card
games, footballs, mechanical toys, toy mobiles, toy vehicles,
toy watches, and toy weapons; dolls; playing cards; card
games; skis; snowboards; baseball gloves; athletic sporting
goods, namely, athletic wrist, ankle and joint supports;
shoulder pads for athletic use; elbow guards for athletic
use; shin guards for athletic use; knee guards for athletic
use; ascenders being mountaineering equipment; climbers’
harness; golf bags with or without wheels; golf balls; golf
gloves; golf equipment namely, balls, clubs, gloves, club
covers; toy bicycles, namely, toy bicycles other than for
transport; toy scooters; athletic protective wrist pads for
skating; athletic protective elbow pads for skating; athletic
protective knee pads for skateboarding; athletic protective
arm pads for skating; toy roller skates; Christmas tree
ornaments and decorations, except confectionery and
electric Christmas tree lights; butterfly nets; fishing tackle;
twirling batons; ride-on toys; chess games; in International
Class 28.2

The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the

Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark PRINCE

KONG, as applied to the goods identified in the application, so resembles the mark

for, inter alia,

electronic action toys; playthings, being action figures and
accessories therefor; plush toys; balloons; bathtub toys;
ride-on toys; equipment sold as a unit for playing cards; toy
vehicles; dolls; flying discs; hand-held unit for playing
electronic games; board games; card games; manipulative
games; action skill games; stand alone video output game
machines; jigsaw and manipulative puzzles; paper face

2 Application Serial No. 87386932 filed on March 27, 2017, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based upon Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce.

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Serial No. 87386932

masks; skateboards; ice skates; water squirting toys; water
toys; kickboard flotation devices for recreational use;
surfboards; swim boards for recreational use; swim fins;
Christmas tree ornaments; paper party favors in the
nature of small toys; paper party hats; playing cards; video
game joysticks; video game machines for use with
televisions, computer game consoles for use with an
external display screen or monitor; all excluding pet toys,
in international class 28;

owned by one registrant (the First Registrant); 3 and the mark for, inter

alia,

bicycles, bicycle structural parts and fittings, namely,
bicycle frames, bicycle saddles, bicycle seats, mudguards,
gear protectors, bicycle chains, forks, springs, wheel rims,
spokes for bicycle wheels, tyres, inner tubes for bicycles,
casings for pneumatic tires, luggage carriers for bicycles,
bicycle stands, bottom bracket wheel bearings for bicycles;
in International Class 12; and

body protectors for bicycle sports, namely, protectors for
the genital area, neck braces, namely, protectors for the
neck vertebrae, wrist protectors, shoulder protectors, chest
protectors, back protectors, knee protectors, elbow
protectors, knuckle protectors, and hip protectors, in
International Class 28;

owned by a different registrant (the Second Registrant);4 as to be likely to cause

confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. When the refusal was made final, Applicant

3 Registration No. 4725954, issued April 28, 2015. The registration contains the following
statements: “Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of the stylized
wording ‘KING KONG’ inside a shaded rectangle with the ‘I’ in the nature of a skyscraper
and designs of small building windows throughout the words.” Additional classes of goods in
the registration were not cited by the Examining Attorney.
4Registration No. 4903289, issued February 23, 2016. The registration contains the following
statements: “Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of the wording
‘KING KONG’ appearing in stylized lettering with ‘KING’ appearing above ‘KONG’.”
Additional classes of goods in the registration were not cited by the Examining Attorney.

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Serial No. 87386932

appealed and requested reconsideration, which was denied. We affirm the refusal to

register.

I. Likelihood of Confusion

Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts

in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In

re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973);

see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir.

2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however, two key considerations are

the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods. See

Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29

(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative

effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the

marks.”).

A. Similarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and Classes of Customers

We first consider the second and third du Pont factors, the similarity of the goods,

channels of trade, and classes of customers. We must make our determinations under

these factors based on the goods as they are identified in the application and cited

registration. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,

110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc.,

281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105

F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous.

Comput. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

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Serial No. 87386932

The First Registrant’s goods include balloons, bathtub toys, dolls, electronic action

toys, playing cards, ride-on toys, and Christmas tree ornaments. These goods are

identical to Applicant’s balloons, bath toys, dolls, electric action toys, playing cards,

ride-on toys, and Christmas tree ornaments.5

The Second Registrant’s goods include various body protectors for bicycle sports

(i.e., for the genitals, neck, wrist, shoulder, chest, back, knee, elbow, knuckle, and

hip). Applicant’s goods include athletic wrist, ankle and joint supports; shoulder pads,

and elbow, shin, and knee guards, all for athletic use; and athletic protective wrist,

elbow, knee, and arm pads for skating. The broadly identified elbow and knee guards

for athletic use in the application encompass the more narrowly identified elbow and

knee protectors for bicycle sports in the Second Registrant’s identification. See In re

Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1134, 1137 (TTAB 2015) (“Applicant’s

broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily encompasses Registrant’s

narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial furniture.”’).

To the extent indicated, the identified goods in the application are identical or

legally identical to the goods in the registrations. In its appeal brief, Applicant does

not dispute that its goods are in-part identical to (or encompass) the First Registrant’s

or Second Registrant’s goods. Given the legal identity of the goods in part, and the

lack of restrictions or limitations in the application and the two cited registrations as

5Because the identifications of goods are in part identical, we need not discuss the similarity
of all of Applicant’s goods because it is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if
relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the identification of goods within a
particular class in the application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d
1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126, n.5
(TTAB 2015); Apple Comput. v. TVNET.Net, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1393, 1398 (TTAB 2007).

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Serial No. 87386932

to their nature, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, we must presume that the

channels of trade and classes of purchasers are also the same. In re Fat Boys Water

Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1518-19 (TTAB 2016); see also In re Viterra Inc., 671

F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Board entitled to rely on

this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).

Based on the in-part identical or legally identical goods set forth in the application

and the cited registrations, and the overlapping trade channels and classes of

purchasers, the du Pont factors of the similarity of the goods, channels of trade, and

classes of customers weigh heavily in favor of likelihood of confusion.

B. Purported Weakness of KONG and KING KONG

Because the strength of the cited KING KONG marks will inform our comparison

of the marks, we address Applicant’s claim that the term KING KONG deserves a

narrow scope of protection because it “is a diluted and weak mark,” and the terms

KING KONG (together) and KONG (by itself) “are in wide commercial use.”6 The

Federal Circuit has held that evidence of extensive registration and use of a term by

others for similar goods can be “powerful” evidence of the term’s weakness. Jack

Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. v. Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797

F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS

Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If the evidence

establishes that the consuming public is exposed to widespread third-party use of

similar marks for similar goods, it “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak

6 Applicant’s Brief, p. 3 (7 TTABVUE 7).

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Serial No. 87386932

and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve

Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693

(Fed. Cir. 2005).

We begin by noting that the wording “King Kong” or “Kong” comprising the cited

marks appears to be arbitrary as applied to the goods identified thereby. Aside from

a suggestion of strength or durability, there is no evidence of record to indicate that

“King Kong” or “Kong” is anything other than a conceptually strong mark.

Nevertheless, in support of his position that KING KONG and KONG are diluted and

weak, Applicant points to the following, seven third-party registered marks, owned

by different parties, identifying goods in Class 28:

Registration No. Mark Goods

4580222 KING KONG CLUBHOUSE Playground equipment,
namely, play structures
comprised of swingsets,
climbers, platforms, jungle
gyms, playhouses, gymnastic
apparatus and slides
41819827 KING KONG Hunting stands; Treestands
for hunting
4725279 Inflatable outdoor products for
soccer, basketball, hockey,
bowling, boxing, football, and
volleyball, being balls, goals
backboards, sticks, pins, bags,
gloves, goal posts, and nets
4757955 BANANA KONG Games, toys, kites, puzzles,
video games, dolls, and
puppets
1331984 DONKEY KONG Video game cartridges

7Although this registration was listed as “live” when Applicant submitted a TESS copy of the
registration with his Request for Reconsideration (at TSDR 36), it was cancelled under
Section 8 during the pendency of this appeal.

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Serial No. 87386932

Registration No. Mark Goods

5520072 KONG PONG Board games, drinking games,
game tables, party games,
tabletop games
5353459 KONG SPORT Pet toys, play balls

In this case there is no evidence of third-party usage, there is only a handful of

third-party registrations – only two of which contain the full literal element of the

cited mark (i.e., KING KONG). Those two third-party registrations are not for the

same goods identified in either cited registration, and Applicant has not submitted

evidence to show that the goods in those two third-party registrations may be

considered “similar” to the goods in either cited registration. See Omaha Steaks Int’l,

Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693-94 (Fed.

Cir. 2018) (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874,

23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc.,

902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he ‘relevant du Pont

inquiry is “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.”’”).

The “existence of [third-party] registrations is not evidence of what happens in the

market place or that customers are familiar with them.” AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure

Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1973). While there is no

minimum number of third-party marks required to show weakness, seven

registrations, coupled with no evidence of uses of KING KONG or KONG-formative

marks, are a relatively small number compared to the number of such marks in cases

that have found weakness based on those marks. See, e.g., In re Inn at St. John’s,

LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (four third-party registrations and no third-party uses

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Serial No. 87386932

were “a far cry from the large quantum of evidence of third-party use and third-party

registrations that was held to be significant” in Jack Wolfskin and Juice Generation).8

Cf. TPI Holdings, Inc. v. TrailerTrader.com, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1409, 1427-28 n.92

(TTAB 2018) (67 third-party registrations and numerous uses of TRADER-formative

marks showed that the formative was weak and could not form the basis of

petitioner’s claimed family of marks); i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed.

Cir. 2017) (where the conflicting marks were identical, evidence of the coexistence of

the cited registered mark with two third-party registrations of the same mark for the

same or similar goods “falls short of the ‘ubiquitous’ or ‘considerable’ use of the mark

components present in” Jack Wolfskin and Juice Generation). The Federal Circuit has

held that “extensive evidence of third-party use and registration ‘is powerful on its

face,’ even where the specific extent and impact of the usage has not been

established,” Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136 (quoting Juice Generation, 115

USPQ2d at 1674-75), but because there is no such “extensive” evidence here – even

stretching for Applicant’s benefit what we might consider similar goods – we must

scrutinize the third-party marks carefully to determine whether they show that the

terms KING KONG or KONG for the goods in the cited registrations are weak. We

find that they do not.9

8 In Jack Wolfskin, there were at least 14 third-party registrations and uses of paw print
marks that showed the weakness of that design element in the opposer’s mark, 116 USPQ2d
at 1136 n.2, while in Juice Generation, there were approximately 26 third-party registrations
and uses of marks containing the words “Peace” and “Love” that showed the weakness of
those words in the opposer’s marks. 115 USPQ2d at 1673 n.1.
9 Moreover, as explained in more detail below, we note that Applicant’s mark PRINCE KONG
is closer in similarity to the cited KING KONG marks than are the other KONG-formative

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Serial No. 87386932

Applicant also points out that, during the prosecution of the application

underlying the first cited registration, the First Registrant argued that the term

KING KONG was “weak and entitled to a narrow scope of protection.”10 Applicant

implies that the First Registrant’s own comments about the weakness of KING

KONG is evidence that the term is, in fact weak, and that therefore, confusion is

unlikely. However, to the extent that the First Registrant took a contrary position

during prosecution of the application underlying the first cited registration, the First

Registrant’s opinion cannot substitute for the Board’s reaching its own ultimate

conclusion on the record now before us. Interstate Brands, Corp. v. Celestial

Seasonings, Inc., 576 F.2d 926, 198 USPQ 151, 154 (CCPA 1978) (“Under no

circumstances, may a party’s opinion, earlier or current, relieve the decision maker

of the burden of reaching his own ultimate conclusion on the entire record.”). “That a

party earlier indicated a contrary opinion respecting the conclusion in a similar

proceeding involving similar marks and goods is a fact, and that fact may be received

in evidence as merely illuminative of shade and tone in the total picture confronting

the decision maker. To that limited extent, a party’s earlier contrary opinion may

be considered relevant and competent.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Specialty

Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 223 USPQ 1281, 1283 (Fed.

Cir. 1984). While we give such limited weight to the First Registrant’s prior

third-party marks. Applicant’s mark contains PRINCE, a royal formative, while the other
marks (with AIR, BANANA, DONKEY, PONG, or SPORT) do not.
10Applicant’s Brief, p. 4 (7 TTABVUE 8); December 21, 2017 Response to Office Action at
TSDR 14-19; July 18, 2018 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 104.

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Serial No. 87386932

statement, we need not be persuaded by it; there is no reason for us to believe that

the First Registrant would consider its statements made in 2014 in a different context

to be equally applicable to Applicant’s present circumstances.

On this record, the cited marks fall in the middle “of the spectrum from very strong

to very weak,” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d

1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and we accord them a normal scope

of protection. The du Pont factors assessing the degree of weakness or strength of the

registered marks are neutral.

C. Similarity of the Marks

We next consider the first du Pont likelihood of confusion factor, which focuses on

“‘the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,

sound, connotation and commercial impression.’” Palm Bay v. Veuve Clicquot, 73

USPQ2d at 1691 (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). “The proper test is not a side-

by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently

similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the

marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc.

v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

(quotation omitted). Consumers may not necessarily encounter the marks in close

proximity and must rely upon their recollections thereof over time. In re Mucky Duck

Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1468 (TTAB 1988). Moreover, where the goods of the

applicant and registrants are identical, as they are in-part in this case, the degree of

similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion

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Serial No. 87386932

is not as great as would be required with diverse goods. See Bridgestone Ams. Tire

Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 102 USPQ2d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir.

2012); Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94

USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The focus is on the recollection of the average

purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of

trademarks. United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049 (TTAB

2014); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009). Here, the average purchaser

includes ordinary consumers who purchase or play with toys and dolls, or who

purchase and use elbow and knee protectors for bicycle sports.

The First Registrant’s mark is comprised of the literal element KING

KONG with design features, and the Second Registrant’s mark is comprised

of the literal element KING KONG in stylized form. In its brief, Applicant does not

dispute the Examining Attorney’s assertion that the wording KING KONG is the

dominant element of each cited mark.11 We agree. It has frequently been recognized

that where a mark consists of a word and a design, the words generally play a

dominant role. In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (“In the case of a composite mark

containing both words and a design, ‘the verbal portion of the mark is the one most

likely to indicate the origin of the goods to which it is affixed.”’) quoting CBS Inc. v.

Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Dakin’s Miniatures,

11 See Examining Attorney’s Brief, unnumbered p. 7 (9 TTABVUE 8).

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Serial No. 87386932

Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 2001) (“words are normally accorded greater weight

because they would be used by purchasers to request the goods”).

Applicant’s mark is PRINCE KONG, in standard characters.12

The record reveals that KING is defined as “a male sovereign,” and PRINCE is

defined as “a male member of a royal family . . . especially a son of the monarch” and

“a hereditary male ruler; a king.”13 Applicant argues that consumers are likely to

focus on the first word of the marks, and that while PRINCE “is the key feature of

[its] mark,” PRINCE and KING “are distinct in meaning” even though “both terms

. . . relate to various forms of monarchical rule.”14

The record also reveals that “King Kong” is “landmark American monster film”15

which has been “deemed ‘culturally, historically and aesthetically significant’ by the

Library of Congress.”16 A sequel titled “The Son of Kong” quickly followed the original

film.17 “The character King Kong has become one of the world’s most famous movie

icons, having inspired countless sequels, remakes, spin-offs, imitators, parodies,

cartoons, books, comics, video games, theme park rides, and a stage play.”18 In view

12It is irrelevant that Registrants’ marks are depicted in a stylized manner because Applicant
seeks registration of its mark in standard characters, and could therefore display it in any
font style, size or color, including in a manner similar to either Registrant’s display. In re
Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1909.
13Ahdictionary.com (AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY), June 21, 2017 Office Action at TSDR
17-18
14 Applicant’s Brief, p. 9 (7 TTABVUE 13).
15 Britannica.com, January 18, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 79.
16 Wikipedia.com, January 18, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 82
17 Id.
18 Wikipedia.com, January 18, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 73.

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Serial No. 87386932

of this evidence, the commercial impression of the cited marks is the “famous” and

“icon[ic]” title character from the “landmark” film: KING KONG. Applicant does not

dispute this.19

The marks have the same structure: two words, the second being KONG.

Applicant’s mark is highly similar in appearance, sound, and connotation to both

Registrants’ marks to the extent that they share the commonly placed second word

KONG which is preceded by the title of a royal male (i.e., either KING or PRINCE).

The connotation of Applicant’s mark is similar to the connotation of the cited marks

– specifically, because a prince is member of a king’s family, and especially the king’s

son, the marks share not only a royal connotation but a direct familial relationship.

Moreover, as the evidence reveals, in the film sequel “Son of Kong,” the character

King Kong had a son – known as a prince.20 The connotations of the marks move even

closer when the “a king” definition is accorded to the word “prince.”

Contrary to Applicant’s assertion that the first words of the marks make them

dissimilar, because KING and PRINCE are related and have similar (and in one case

identical) meanings, the first words do little to differentiate their appearances, sound,

and commercial impressions. When considered in their entireties, the similarities in

the marks outweigh their differences. The recollection of the average purchaser, who

normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks, see In re

19 Indeed, Applicant admits that “’KING KONG’ is a popular and iconic movie character who
is a giant ape.” Applicant’s Brief, p. 4 (7 TTABVUE 8).
20Movie Review, Another Jungle Monster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1933. The review is probative
of the perceptions of the author and of the content received by the readers.

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Serial No. 87386932

Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests.

Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d mem., 972 F.2d 1353

(Fed. Cir. 1992)), would likely recall the famous film character, King Kong which is

named in the Registrants’ marks, and associate him with Applicant’s PRINCE KONG

mark.

Considering the overall sound, appearance, commercial impression, and

connotation of each Registrant’s mark and Applicant’s mark, we find that consumers

are likely to view PRINCE KONG as significantly related to KING KONG precisely

because of the word PRINCE, which denotes both a royal familial relationship and

sometimes the position of king itself. That is, customers would perceive the two marks

as related to each other and pointing to a common source. Accordingly, we find that

the du Pont factor of the similarity of the marks weighs in favor of finding a likelihood

of confusion.

D. Balancing the Factors

We find that the goods identified in the application are identical or legally

identical in-part to the goods in the registrations, and that Applicant’s goods travel

in the same channels of trade and to the same classes of purchasers as each of the

cited Registrant’s goods. The cited marks are neither weak nor diluted and are

entitled to a normal scope of protection. Applicant’s PRINCE KONG mark is similar

in appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression to the First Registrant’s

mark and the Second Registrant’s mark. In view thereof, the

relevant factors favor a finding of a likelihood of confusion.

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Serial No. 87386932

II. Decision

The refusal to register Applicant’s mark PRINCE KONG under Section 2(d) of the

Trademark Act is affirmed.

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